Protect Mcp Setup
Configure Cedar policy enforcement and Ed25519 signed receipts for Claude Code tool calls. Use when setting up projects that need cryptographic audit trails, policy-gated tool execution, or compliance-ready evidence of agent actions.
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When to use this skill
Use Protect Mcp Setup when an AI agent needs a reusable SKILL.md workflow for this job: Configure Cedar policy enforcement and Ed25519 signed receipts for Claude Code tool calls. Use when setting up projects that need cryptographic audit trails, policy-gated tool execution, or compliance-ready evidence of agent actions.
When not to use it
Skip Protect Mcp Setup when the task is outside the coding category, or when a more specific skill in this directory already covers the same workflow with clearer triggers.
How to install
Where will you use it?
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/protect-mcp-setup # Save SKILL.md to ~/.claude/skills/protect-mcp-setup/SKILL.md
- Claude Code personal install: place the skill and its bundled files at ~/.claude/skills/protect-mcp-setup/SKILL.md. For a shared project, commit the folder at .claude/skills/protect-mcp-setup/ instead.
- Current Claude Code detects SKILL.md changes in watched directories during the session. If you just created a top-level skills directory, run /reload-skills. Check that the skill is listed before testing its trigger.
- For Claude chat or Cowork in the Desktop app, manage uploaded skills in Customize > Skills; copying files into a local Claude Code folder is not a Desktop install. Other agents may use different install locations.
Full install guide for Claude, Cursor, and Codex →
Try a starter prompt
After installing the skill, paste this starter prompt into your agent to verify it triggers on a small task.
Use the Protect Mcp Setup skill for this task: Use Protect Mcp Setup when this documented workflow matches the task. Confirm any required inputs or files before making changes.
What supports this recommendation?
72/100 provisional content score. This measures documentation, practical detail and source signals. It is not a measured task success rate or a security certification.
- Documentation
- 77/100
- Practical detail
- 68/100
- Source evidence
- 63/100
- Source signals
- 80/100
Model compatibility evidence
- claudeinferred
The skill text mentions Claude or a closely associated term. This is keyword-derived compatibility; no hands-on model test is recorded.
- chatgptuntested
No model-specific signal or recorded compatibility test was found.
- geminiuntested
No model-specific signal or recorded compatibility test was found.
- copilotuntested
No model-specific signal or recorded compatibility test was found.
- llamauntested
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- perplexityuntested
No model-specific signal or recorded compatibility test was found.
- mistraluntested
No model-specific signal or recorded compatibility test was found.
- grokuntested
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Inferred compatibility is based on content signals. Check the app, its available tools and setup requirements before running a skill.
What this skill does
# protect-mcp — Policy Enforcement + Signed Receipts
Cryptographic governance for every Claude Code tool call. Each invocation is evaluated against a Cedar policy and produces an Ed25519-signed receipt that anyone can verify offline.
## Overview
Claude Code runs powerful tools: `Bash`, `Edit`, `Write`, `WebFetch`. By default there is no audit trail, no policy enforcement, and no way to prove what was decided after the fact. `protect-mcp` closes all three gaps:
- **Cedar policies** (AWS's open authorization engine) evaluate every tool call before execution. Cedar deny is authoritative. - **Ed25519 receipts** record the name of each tool that ran, signed with your key. - **Offline verification** via `npx @veritasacta/verify`. No server, no account, no trust in the operator.
## Problem
AI agents make decisions that affect money, safety, and rights. The Claude Code session log records what happened, but the log is:
- Mutable — anyone with access can edit it - Unsigned — there is no way to prove integrity - Operator-bound — verification requires trusting whoever holds the log
For compliance contexts (finance, healthcare, regulated research), this is not sufficient. You need tamper-evident evidence that can be verified by third parties without trusting you.
## Solution
Add `protect-mcp` to your Claude Code project:
```bash # 1. Install the plugin (adds hooks + skill to your project) claude plugin install wshobson/agents/protect-mcp
# 2. Create ./protect.cedar (see below). The plugin installs the hooks.
# 3. Create the signing key once (protect-mcp 0.32.4 sign does not create it). # An existing key is never replaced. See references/receipt-format.md to rotate. if [ ! -e ./protect-mcp.key ]; then d=$(mktemp -d) && npx [email protected] init --dir "$d" && mv "$d/keys/gateway.json" ./protect-mcp.key fi chmod 600 ./protect-mcp.key echo "/protect-mcp.key" >> .gitignore
# 4. Use Claude Code normally. Every tool call is now policy-evaluated # and produces a signed receipt in ./receipts/ ```
## Hook Configuration
Installing the plugin adds both hooks from `hooks/hooks.json`. Each hook runs a script bundled with the plugin:
```json { "hooks": { "PreToolUse": [ { "matcher": ".*", "hooks": [ { "type": "command", "command": "\"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}\"/hooks/evaluate.sh" } ] } ], "PostToolUse": [ { "matcher": ".*", "hooks": [ { "type": "command", "command": "\"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}\"/hooks/sign.sh" } ] } ] } } ```
Claude Code passes the hook event to the command as JSON on stdin and does not set `TOOL_NAME` or `TOOL_INPUT` variables. `evaluate.sh` reads `tool_name` and `tool_input` from that payload and passes them to `protect-mcp` as flags; `sign.sh` reads `tool_name` only, preserving tool-only receipt coverage. The signing hook keeps stdout empty, checks the CLI summary, and reports signer failures on stderr. Set `PROTECT_MCP_POLICY`, `PROTECT_MCP_RECEIPTS`, and `PROTECT_MCP_KEY` to change the default paths. When the policy file is missing, the PreToolUse hook prints a warning to stderr and allows the call.
### What each hook does
**PreToolUse** — Runs BEFORE the tool executes. Evaluates the tool call against your Cedar policy file. If Cedar returns `deny`, the hook exits with code 2 and Claude Code blocks the tool call entirely.
**PostToolUse** runs AFTER the tool completes. It signs a receipt that names the tool and appends it to `./receipts/receipts.jsonl`. This hook does not pass the tool input or output to the signer.
## Cedar Policy File
Create `./protect.cedar` at the project root:
```cedar // Read-only tools: one rule can name several tools in `when`. Add WebFetch // with your own URL rule. permit (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource) when { resource == Tool::"Read" || resource == Tool::"Glob" || resource == Tool::"Grep" };
// Safe commands only; git limited to read subcommands permit (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource == Tool::"Bash") when { context has input && context.input has command && (context.input.command like "git status*" || context.input.command like "git diff*" || context.input.command like "git log*" || context.input.command like "git show*" || context.input.command like "npm*" || context.input.command like "ls*" || context.input.command like "cat*" || context.input.command like "echo*" || context.input.command like "pwd*" || context.input.command like "test*") };
// No chaining (`&` also denies `2>&1`), `$` expansion, redirection (`>` or // `<`, which covers `<(`), file output (`git diff --output`), or rm -rf forbid (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource == Tool::"Bash") when { context has input && context.input has command && (context.input.command like "*;*" || context.input.command like "*&*" || context.input.command like "*|*" || context.input.command like "*$*" || context.input.command like "*`*" || context.input.command like "*>*" || context.input.command like "*<*" || context.input.command like "*\n*" || context.input.command like "*--output*" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf*") };
// Writes only inside the project (paths are absolute), never via `..` permit (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource) when { (resource == Tool::"Write" || resource == Tool::"Edit") && context has input && context.input has file_path && context.input.file_path like "/path/to/project/*" }; forbid (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource) when { (resource == Tool::"Write" || resource == Tool::"Edit") && context has input && context.input has file_path && (context.input.file_path like "*/../*" || context.input.file_path like "*/..") }; ```
String matching is best-effort: `like` checks the raw string, not a resolved path, and an `npm*` permit runs arbitrary code, so it is only as safe as the project's scripts.
## Verification
Verify every receipt against the public key in `./protect-mcp.key`:
```bash PUB=$(node -p 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync("./protect-mcp.key")).publicKey') npx @veritasacta/[email protected] --replay-chain ./receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PUB" # Exit 0 = every receipt verified # Exit 1 = a receipt failed (tampered, wrong key, or malformed line) # Exit 2 = the file could not be read ```
The plugin's slash commands do the same inside Claude Code. `/verify-receipt` takes one receipt in its own file, e.g., from `tail -n 1 ./receipts/receipts.jsonl > receipt.json`.
``` /verify-receipt receipt.json /audit-chain --last 20 ```
## Receipt Format
Each receipt is one line of `./receipts/receipts.jsonl`. See [`references/receipt-format.md`](references/receipt-format.md) for a sample.
- **Ed25519** signatures (RFC 8032) over the canonical `payload` - **JCS canonicalization** (RFC 8785) before signing - **Signed public key** in the payload; supply a trusted key with `--key` - **Hash link** to the previous receipt, checked during replay
The verifier detects broken links between surviving receipts, including interior deletion or reordering. A truncated tail and deletion or reordering within the legacy portion of a mixed log can go undetected. Editing signed contents still fails signature verification. Keep an externally retained checkpoint or copy to check completeness.
## Why This Matters
| Before | After | |--------|-------| | "Trust me, the agent only read files" | Cryptographically provable: every Read logged and signed | | "The log shows it happened" | The receipt proves it happened, and no one can edit it | | "You'd have to audit our system" | Anyone can verify every receipt offline | | "Logs might be different by now" | Ed25519 signatures lock the record at signing time |
## Standards
- **Ed25519** — RFC 8032 (digital signatures) - **JCS** — RFC 8785 (deterministic JSON canonicalization) - **Cedar** — AWS's open authorization policy language - **IETF draft** — [draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts/)
## Related
- **npm**: [protect-mcp](https://www.npmjs.com/package/protect-mcp) - **Verify CLI**: [@veritasacta/verify](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@veritasacta/verify) - **Source**: [github.com/ScopeBlind/scopeblind-gateway](https://github.com/ScopeBlind/scopeblind-gateway) - **Protocol**: [veritasacta.com](https://veritasacta.com) - **Integrations**: Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit (PR #667), AWS cedar-policy/cedar-for-agents (PR #64)
Intended uses
- Use Protect Mcp Setup when this documented workflow matches the task.
Implementation notes
- Review the source instructions and adapt inputs before running the workflow.
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